Section II of my essay.
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Section II
In this section, I will seek to demonstrate why engaged bioethics is better placed than philosophical bioethics to resolve a real-life issue, such as my test-case, due to its in-depth engagement with the data.
It is not controversial to point out that empirical facts are used in ethical arguments. Bioethicists regard knowledge of the empirical data related to any case they are considering as an essential requirement in their ethical analysis (McKeown 2017). Engaged ethicists, however, will take a more fine-grained and wide-ranging approach to the collection of empirical data.
Wolff recommends starting out by examining the existing policy. So, in this case, the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986[1] permits the use of animals where it is necessary and/or unavoidable, but also requires alternatives to be used where possible and encourages the development of such alternatives as well as adherence to the ‘3Rs’. These are, briefly, to seek to replace animals by using other methods or models, such as cells or computer imaging; to reduce the number of animals used and to refine their use, by minimising suffering and increasing welfare.
A further target is tacitly acknowledged, and clearly stated by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in their 2005 report[2]: ultimately, to move entirely away from using animals. That target is commensurate with much of the writing on animal ethics.
In my example, then, the issue is whether the use of rodents is necessary and/or unavoidable in depression research and/or whether it brings sufficient useful scientific knowledge to warrant the harm caused.
Considering the empirical data raises an important point.
In domains where there are strongly opposing forces, data becomes contested. Scientists opposed to animal experimentation have conducted systematic reviews which cast doubt on the validity of depression research using rodents compared to research using alternatives (Carvalho, Varela, et al. 2020; Carvalho, Peste, et al. 2020). Indeed, these studies suggest that more benefit may have been obtained by giving the rodents to treatment-resistant depressives as companion animals (Wells 2009). But as with other studies making a similar case against animal experimentation in other domains (Shanks, Greek, and Greek 2009; Pound and Bracken 2014; Akhtar 2015), while these data are cited by ethicists opposed to animal research, they are critiqued by those who support animal research, and found to be unconvincing.
Researchers investigating depression admit that insufficient progress has been made, but believe that more and better-designed experiments using rodents will elicit worthwhile benefits (Gururajan et al. 2019; Anisman and Matheson 2005; Krishnan and Nestler 2011; Planchez, Surget, and Belzung 2019).
The engaged ethicist would have to address these conflicting claims.
She would also need to understand the suffering caused by, prevalence of and current knowledge of the etiology of depression (a complex condition of which the biomedical component is only one aspect); the harms caused to rodents both as a result of research (my literature review suggests most would be in the ‘moderate’ category, meaning markedly worse than just blood draws) and also the harms caused by breeding, captivity, transportation and death. Here, the work of cognitive ethologists and animal psychologists regarding the needs and capabilities of rodents, would also be relevant. Rodents are widely considered a cheap, convenient and ethically less controversial experimental model than non-human primates, but this assumption might be selling rodents short[3].
Of equal importance to the engaged ethicist are any constraints that might prevent or limit change to the status quo. Reality has been shaped in the light of existing policy and ‘the burden of argument for change is higher than for reflective or unreflective continuation of current policy’ (Wolff 2012), thus the benefits of change will need to be significant and the harms limited. For example, a ban would end harms to rodents, but could lead to a greater use of genetically-modified non-human primates. If there were a lack of alternatives, or of the reliability and expertise to merit their use, there may be further delays in reaching any clinically useful information - a harm that can be overlooked (Ferrari 2019).
It would also be important to research the state of therapeutics currently available for and being developed for depression using other means[4]. This might mitigate the potential harms of limiting or banning the use of rodents.
All this demands an open-minded attitude, according to Wolff. As Colin Farrelly writes, ‘philosophers must engage in a self-conscious dialogue’ with experts from different disciplines and who have different views. ‘Doing this,’ he continues, ‘ensures that non-ideal considerations, like budget constraints, disagreement, limited knowledge and indeterminacy, will figure prominently in our philosophical analysis’ (Farrelly 2007).
In a committee situation, where consensus, or at least broad approval, is required before any resolution can be enacted, it is critical to be fully cognizant of all the empirical data. The engaged ethicist will be better placed than a philosophical ethicist to obtain a resolution because she fully understands the complexity of the situation.
[1] https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/14/contents [2] https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/publications/animal-research [3] For a good overview of rat capabilities see https://aeon.co/essays/why-dont-rats-get-the-same-ethical-protections-as-primates [4] See for example (Carhart-Harris et al. 2018)
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