The end of liberty

We are approaching the end, and you may be glad to know that having nearly completed this final post I lost all my work and had to start again, so it is probably shorter than it would have been.

However, I do feel that this is an important document and that it sheds light on some of our current concerns.

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The principles asserted in these pages must be more generally admitted as the basis for discussion of details, before a consistent application of them to all the various departments of government and morals can be attempted with any prospect of advantage.

This is good as he insists that his ideas, like any other, must be subjected to the rigour of public discussion.

In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others,or intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining.Such oppositions of interest between individuals often arise from bad social institutions, but are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some would be unavoidable under any institutions. Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive examination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by common admission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences. In other words, society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed competitors to immunity from this kind of suffering; and feels called on to interfere, only when means of success have been employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit—namely, fraud or treachery, and force.

Here he allows that in competition for jobs and positions some individuals will be limited - but that, so long as there is equality of opportunity and that the institutions are just, this is inevitable - and, one imagines, should lead to a fair situation where those most suitable for certain posts are appointed. Note though that this assumes no nepotism, no corruption and, what is most relevant now perhaps, a level playing field to start with.

He goes on to consider Free Trade - the need to have the market dictate pricing but also the requirement for true claims in advertising. He condemns limitations on trade, because this limits the freedom of the individual buyer, even when such goods are poisons or alcohol. He goes on to condemn, for example, prohibition laws in the United States.

The preventive function of government, however, is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than the punitory function;—for there is hardly any part of the legitimate freedom of action of a human being which would not admit of being represented, and fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form or other of delinquency. Nevertheless, if a public authority, or even a private person, sees any one evidently preparing to commit a crime, they are not bound to look on inactive until the crime is committed, but may interfere to prevent it.

Here follows an interesting and close grained analysis of what one may do to prevent accidents or crimes. ill's position is that if such an event looks inevitable, both individuals and the police have a responsibility to prevent it. But they cannot act just because they fear that such an event might take place. So we can consider here 'stop and search', for example. In all cases, Mill is eager to protect the individual - but where the individual seems likely to harm society, or to fail to fulfil duties to society or others, he is willing to state that both prevention and punishment are in order. For example, someone who has committed a crime when drunk may not be prevented from drinking, but should they commit a like offence again when drunk, they may have a more severe punishment. Likewise, if one refuses to work, thus failing to support one's children, the state can force him to work.

In a similar vein, he condemns acts of indecency in public places, for this can be seen as a harm to society. This is trickier, of course, as what constitutes indecency is culturally dependent - a point which he does not address. That seems rather strange considering his earlier accounts of the need for people to live as they will and the claim that 'public opinion' is inherently limiting.

The case of a person who solicits another to do an act is not strictly a case of self-regarding conduct. To give advice or offer inducements to any one is a social act, and may, therefore, like actions in general which affect others, be supposed amenable to social control. But a little reflection corrects the first impression, by showing that if the case is not strictly within the definition of individual liberty, yet the reasons on which the principle of individual liberty is grounded are applicable to it. If people must be allowed, in whatever concerns only themselves, to act as seems best to themselves, at their own peril, they must equally be free to consult with one another about what is fit to be so done; to exchange opinions, and give and receive suggestions.

This is very nuanced. Here he says that just as I am allowed to gamble, say, so I should be allowed to praise the merits of it, even encourage another to do it - but, he goes on, not when I stand to gain. So this puts into question the status of gambling-houses. And here he comes to a thorny issue: gambling and fornication are matters of individual concern, but what about brothels and gambling houses. Should they be banned? He discusses these issues in detail, stating arguments on both sides and in the end says he will not, in this paper, come down for or against.

There is similar nuance in the argument as to whether it is just to tax alcohol. I quote this passage in its entirety as the argument is worth following and perhaps could have implications for other potential sources of government revenue: A further question is, whether the State, while it permits, should nevertheless indirectly discourage conduct which it deems contrary to the best interests of the agent; whether, for example, it should take measures to render the means of drunkenness more costly, or add to the difficulty of procuring them by limiting the number of the places of sale.On this as on most other practical questions, many distinctions require to be made. To tax stimulants for the sole purpose of making them more difficult to be obtained, is a measure differing only in degree from their entire prohibition; and would be justifiable only if that were justifiable. Every increase of cost is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the augmented price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on them for gratifying a particular taste. Their choice of pleasures, and their mode of expending their income, after satisfying their legal and moral obligations to the State and to individuals, are their own concern,and must rest with their own judgment. These considerations may seem at first sight to condemn the selection of stimulants as special subjects of taxation for purposes of revenue. But it must be remembered that taxation for fiscal purposes is absolutely inevitable; that in most countries it is necessary that a considerable part of that taxation should be indirect; that the State, therefore, cannot help imposing penalties, which to some persons may be prohibitory, on the use of some articles of consumption. It is hence the duty of the State to consider, in the imposition of taxes, what commodities the consumers can best spare; and a fortiori, to select in preference those of which it deems the use, beyond a very moderate quantity, to be positively injurious. Taxation, therefore,of stimulants, up to the point which produces the largest amount of revenue (supposing that the State needs all the revenue which it yields) is not only admissible, but to be approved of.

Another long quote coming up, which is actually the following paragraph: The question of making the sale of these commodities a more or less exclusive privilege, must be answered differently, according to the purposes to which the restriction is intended to be subservient. All places of public resort require the restraint of a police, and places of this kind peculiarly, because offences against society are especially apt to originate there. It is, therefore, fit to confine the power of selling these commodities (at least for consumption on the spot) to persons of known or vouched-for respectability of conduct; to make such regulations respecting hours of opening and closing as may be requisite for public surveillance, and to withdraw the licence if breaches of the peace repeatedly take place through the connivance or incapacity of the keeper of the house, or if it becomes a rendezvous for concocting and preparing offences against the law. Any further restriction I do not conceive to be, in principle, justifiable. The limitation in number, for instance, of beer and spirit houses, for the express purpose of rendering them more difficult of access, and diminishing the occasions of temptation, not only exposes all to an inconvenience because there are some by whom the facility would be abused, but is suited only to a state of society in which the labouring classes are avowedly treated as children or savages, and placed under an education of restraint, to fit them for future admission to the privileges of freedom. This is not the principle on which the labouring classes are professedly governed in any free country; and no person who sets due value on freedom will give his adhesion to their being so governed, unless after all efforts have been exhausted to educate them for freedom and govern them as freemen, and it has been definitively proved that they can only be governed as children. The bare statement of the alternative shows the absurdity of supposing that such efforts have been made in any case which needs be considered here. It is only because the institutions of this country are a mass of inconsistencies,that things find admittance into our practice which belong to the system of despotic, or what is called paternal, government, while the general freedom of our institutions precludes the exercise of the amount of control necessary to render the restraint of any real efficacy as a moral education.

This I find quite challenging. First he states that there should be restrictions on drinking venues - some fair enough, others more questionable - vouched-for respectibility?? Then the passage about the labouring classes - who should not be treated like children, so long as all efforts have been made to educate them. There is an elitism here, of course, but what I can't understand is if he's saying that paternalism is enforced because education has not been adequately provided or that education has been provided and thus paternalism is utterly offensive?

Mill then considers the ways in which men seek to restrain the liberty of their wives - which he says is a disgrace and the state should prevent it and the ways in which parents regard their children as their property, and will brook no interference from the state - here Mill is forthright: Is it not almost a self-evident axiom, that the State should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen? Yet who is there that is not afraid to recognise and assert this truth? Hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of the most sacred duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now stand, the father), after summoning a human being into the world, to give to that being an education fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others and towards himself. But while this is unanimously declared to be the father’s duty, scarcely anybody, in this country, will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it. Instead of his being required to make any exertion or sacrifice for securing education to his child, it is left to his choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis! It still remains unrecognised, that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society; and that if the parent does not fulfil this obligation, the State ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of the parent.

So here he is claiming that parents have an obligation to provide for their children and an obligation to the state to ensure that the child is educated. He then argues for universal education - but he does not want 'state education' in terms of a set curriculum. This is complex. He wants the state to enforce education and to pay for those whose parents cannot afford it, but not to dictate what precisely should be taught, for this would turn everyone into herd like creatures rather than individuals. He does, though, argue for regular testing. I think he's opposed to 'big government', essentially.

But here we see him make a claim for an incredible restriction - but one that in the light of climate change might have more relevance today, even if greeted with greater distaste: The fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most responsible actions in the range of human life. To under-take this responsibility—to bestow a life which may be either a curse or a blessing—unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being. And in a country either over-peopled, or threatened with being so, to produce children, beyond a very small number, with the effect of reducing the reward of labour by their competition, is a serious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their labour. The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, d onot exceed the legitimate powers of the State: and whether such laws be expedient or not (a question mainly dependent on local circumstances and feelings), they are not objectionable as violations of liberty. Such laws are interferences of the State to prohibit a mischievous act—an act injurious to others, which ought to be a subject of reprobation, and social stigma, even when it is not deemed expedient to superadd legal punishment. Yet the current ideas of liberty, which bend so easily to real infringements of the freedom of the individual in things which concern only himself, would repel the attempt to put any restraint upon his inclinations when the consequence of their indulgence is a life or lives of wretchedness and depravity to the offspring, with manifold evils to those sufficiently within reach to be in any way affected by their actions.When we compare the strange respect of mankind for liberty, with their strange want of respect for it, we might imagine that a man had an indispensable right to do harm to others, and no right at all to please himself without giving pain to any one.

The case he makes is that to bring a child into the world without being able to provide for it is an offense against the child. This is a precursor to more recent claims about responsibilities to future generations.

In the final section, he discusses ways in which the government might be involved in a benevolent way, but which still to him seem inappropriate. Essentially, this seems to be stating the case for delegation, regionalisation. But I quote this passage as I think it is interesting: In many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education—a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal. This is a principal,though not the sole, recommendation of jury trial (in cases not political); of free and popular local and municipal institutions; of the conduct of industrial and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary associations.These are not questions of liberty, and are connected with that subject only by remote tendencies; but they are questions of development. It belongs to a different occasion from the present to dwell on these things as parts of national education; as being, in truth, the peculiar training of a citizen, the practical part of the political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and family selfishness,and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint interests, the management of joint concerns—habituating them to act from public or semi-public motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from one another. Without these habits and powers, a free constitution can neither be worked nor preserved; as is exemplified by the too-often transitory nature of political freedom in countries where it does not rest upon a sufficient basis of local liberties.

In this section he also argues against too much government power - and for this reason says that bureaucrats should not be hugely remunerated. This is fascinating in the light on current concerns about 'technocrats': If indeed all the high talent of the country could be drawn into the service of the government, a proposal tending to bring about that result might well inspire uneasiness. If every part of the business of society which required organised concert, or large and comprehensive views, were in the hands of the government, and if government offices were universally filled by the ablest men, all the enlarged culture and practised intelligence in the country, except the purely speculative, would be concentrated in a numerous bureaucracy, to whom alone the rest of the community would look for all things: the multitude for direction and dictation in all they had to do; the able and aspiring for personal advancement. To be admitted into the ranks of this bureaucracy, and when admitted, to rise therein, would be the sole objects of ambition. Under this regime, not only is the outside public ill-qualified, for want of practical experience, to criticise or check the mode of operation of the bureaucracy, but even if the accidents of despotic or the natural working of popular institutions occasionally raise to the summit a ruler or rulers of reforming inclinations, no reform can be effected which is contrary to the interest of the bureaucracy.

He cites the America of his day as a fine example of delegated power: [L]et them be left without a government, every body of Americans is able to improvise one, and to carry on that or any other public business with a sufficient amount of intelligence, order, and decision. This is what every free people ought to be: and a people capable of this is certain to be free; it will never let itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the reins of the central administration. No bureaucracy can hope to make such a people as this do or undergo anything that they do not like. But where everything is done through the bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all.

And here is the concluding section of the essay (I can hear the sighs of relief): The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State which postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation to a little more of administrative skill, or of that semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes—will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish.